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Testimony Before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Paul Ramsey, Ph.D., Litt. D.

This testimony was originally
published in the May 81, 1974
issue of COMMONWEAL under
the title " Protecting the Unborn."
Reprinted with permission from
COMMONWEAL, 232 Madison
Avenue, New York , N. Y. 10016.
Dr. Ramsey is Harrington
Spear Paine Professor of Religion
at Princeton University. A scholar and teacher in the fields of
religious ethics and social philosophy, he is also concerned with
the serious moral issues emerging
in the area of medical ethics.
I am here as a private individual who on January 22,1973, was
robbed of his right as a citizen to
participate in the public processes
by which we as a people determine the outer limits of the human community - the limit at
the first of life and soon it may
also be t he limit at t he end of life
- within which boundaries an
equal justice and equal protectability should prevail for all who
bear the agreed "signs of life."
These are judgments about the
best factual evidence. Physicians
are our deputies in applying the
criteria for stating that a man has
died ; but they alone do not set
the criteria. In the unlikely event
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that physicians began to allow
people to die all the way through
to the end of cellular life (until
hair and nails stopped growing)
we would find ways of telling
them that that is not what we
mean by the difference between a
still living human being and a
corpse. I hope we would do the
same in the (more likely) event
that physicians began to declare
people dead not on the basis of
brain-stem death (the current
"up-dating"), but when there is
only cessation or destruction of
the higher cortical functions of
the brain (thus certifying as
corpses for burial or for organ donation bodies whose hearts still
are beating spontaneously and
naturally without any external
support-systems) .
So we have legislation or caselaw based on it, wise or unwise,
traditional or novel, defining
death. This legitimates or deputizes physician declarations of
death. Professor Alexander M.
Capron of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School has recently summarized the need for
and the propriety of a societal
function in regard to new proposals for updating the criteria
for death which physicians apply.l
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Now suppose the Supreme
Court were to rule that determining the outer limit of the human
community short of which there
exists a right to life still resident
in the dying is a matter falling
strictly within the privacy of the
doctor-patient relation, or is even
to be decided by physician and
family members. On this supposition the state legislatures could
limit what physicians do in making life and death decisions only
by licensure. Would that Court
decision not be deemed an exercise of "raw judicial power?"
Would there not be need for a
constitutional amendment to restore the setting of criteria to our
public and legislative processes?
The deputyship of physicians or
of any single individual or group
of individuals does not extend to
fixing the criteria for determining
who shall or shall not be deemed
a subject of rights. That surely
is the people's business. While
saying it did not settle that issue, the Supreme Court did just
that - all the while proclaiming
that when individual human life
begins is a murky theological
question. For all practical purposes the Court pronounced that
no one enters the human community nor has any rights due
him until viability. Questionable
as that may be, it at least has the
virtue of being based on an implicit claim to possess the best
factual evidence in the light of
modern knowledge. But behind
that is, for me, the monstrous
claim that the Court decides such
matters.
270

To restore to political and legislative decision-making processes
the power to draw an agreed limit
as to the first entrance of a human being into the human community is, of course, to load us
the people again with a fearsome
responsibility. I see no escaping
that, since I know of no revelation
of such factual judgments. The
only thing more fearful would,
however, be for such verdicts to
be placed in the hands of private
individuals, or to be determined
by a 7-2 decision of the Court.
Such have always been among
the human, all too human decisions silently taken by mankind
in the course of our torturous history. Christian teachings about
abortion, for example, have varied
over the centuries. But these have
varied according to changing
judgments about the evidence for
believing there is a new life on the
human scene. Fancies about 40
and 80 days of gestational life, reliance on quickening, etc. have
been grounds in times past for
drawing the line between unprotectable and protectable human
life. Only in the nineteenth century after the discovery of the
ovum did there come to be a
credible rational basis for either
Catholics or the A. M. A. (see q.
in Wade) to believe that life begins with conception.
The Worth of Human Life
What has generally been invariant in Western civilization has
been the rights and dignity and
protection to be accorded to the
individual life deemed to be huLinacre Quarterly

man. Our religious faiths, our
philosophies of life, our humanistic visions have to do with justifying and upholding the worth we
recognize in or impute to human
life. "Subsuming cases" under the
value of life - to say, This is a
human life that has now put in
his claim upon the human community to be accorded equal justice and protection - that is a
different sort of judgment, and
one to be made with fear and
trembling. Yet we collectively
must decide such matters, and
shall continue to do so as long as
we have the courage to accept the
necessity for together setting the
criteria for finding a life to be
human life at either end of the
scale. It is only the pretense that
we can remain civilized after such
decisions are left up to the vagaries of private judgment that
has to be denied.
I candidly state to you that I
am not very hopeful over what
people generally through their
representatives will decide about
these life and death issues - in
a technologically medical era
when "quality of life" is judged
to override being alive, and
"Choose" has replaced "Choose
life" as our moral maxim.
Some comfort may be taken
from the fact that over ten years
ago the demographer Judith
Blake took a look at the antipermissive abortion sentiment in
this country and advised that the
only way to accomplish an arbitrary liberty to choose between
one life and another in its early
stages was to go to the Supreme
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Court to see whether it would
take from the legislatures their
power to determine and represent
the social compact. I take it,
however, that any so-called " prolifer" had rather be out-voted
than overruled and deprived of
voice concerning the limits and
the life-and-death terms of our
social compact. This, not winning,
is what is at stake in the profound
alienation of millions and millions
and millions of people brought
about by the Court's decision in
January 1973. I am very sorry
that (as reported in the press)
Justice Blackmun has received a
good deal of "hate mail" since the
decision he wrote for the Court.
But I pray that he can fathom
even in that the moral outrage
over being deprived as a people
of one of the most important aspects of our together being a people over the course of time. Everyone knows along the pulses
that for whom the bell tolls in
these arbitrary -life-and-death decisions, now surfaced to consciousness and made "safe" by
modern medicine, it could have
tolled for him long ago and may
yet toll for him at the end of life's
span.
With power restored to the people to determine agreed criteria
for including anyone in or excluding anyone from the human
community, we still may go on
our way toward some technological version of the definitional solution practiced by the Nuer tribe
in Africa who treat infants born
with grave deformities or suffering from genetic anomalies as ba271

by hippopotamuses, accidentally
born to humans and, with this
labeling, the appropriate action is
clear: they gently lay them in the
river where they belong.! A shudder along the spine of every
American is surely a fitting reaction to the Court's account of
why Western medicine has always
been concerned to protect unborn
lives. This is to be accounted for,
we are told, because Christianity
happened to take up the views of
the Pythagoreans, a small sect in
the Graeco-Roman world, with its
Hippocratic oath pledging physicians never to give abortificants.
In now overcoming that limitation, we are asked to recall that
pagan outlooks in general and
medicine in particular in preChristian ages opposed neither
abortion nor suicide. Passed over
in silence is the fact that approval
of abortion was associated with
approval of infanticide.
A Prophecy Fulfilled?
In this there is retrospective
prophecy well on the way toward
fulfillment today! A doctor at
Yale-New Haven Hospital, explaining on national television the
newly announced policy of benign
neglect of defective infants in that
medical center, says that to have
a life worth living a baby must
be " lovable." Millard S. Everett
in his book I d eals of Life writes
that "no child should be admitted
into the society of the living" who
suffers "any physical or mental
defect that would prevent marriage or would make others tolerate his company only from a
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sense of mercy ... " Who is there
among us who need not reply to
that, "Mercy, me!"? Michael
Tooley, Professor of philosophy at
Stanford Univesrity, concludes
that while it would be reprehensible to torture kittens, infants or
other sentient creatures for an
hour, it would not be wrong and
no denial of rights to kill babies
in the hospital nursery during the
first two weeks after medically
checking their acceptability, since
human babies are no . more than
kittens and cannot be bearers of
rights until they have self-consciousness of themselves as persons. 3 A physician at the U niversity of Virginia writes that he believes a woman's decision to allow
a defective baby to die is "her
second chance to have an abortion." A fellow theologian , I regret to say, always replies when
I use the term " infanticide" : I
prefer to call it "neo-naticide"! I
myself am surprised by none of
these views, nor for that matter
do I consider them illogical extensions of what we are doing in
the matter of abortion, nor are
they without some backing. The
legal and moral chaos they bespeak stems rather from letting
decisions about the criteria for
acceptable life and rightful death
decisions fall under the arbitration of private individuals.
To say the least, the Court
started these retrogressions into
technological medical barbarism
from which we shall not soon recover, when it exercised no judicial restraint, when it refused to
Linacre Quarterly

trust the people's moral sensibility and legislative deliberation to
achieve rough agreement about
who belongs with us in the community of equal rights bearers.
That decision must somehow be
reversed and life-and-death standard-setting must be de-privatized.
In doing this, the Court itself
rolled back by one stroke of the
pen steadily increasing respect for
the unborn child in the law itself
- propelled onward and upward
for decades by our increased
knowledge of the humanity of
unborn life in the modern period.
That knowledge had all but
opened a "new age of human
childhood. " Yet the Court declared that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense." That,
I believe, is demonstrably erroneous. Perhaps the Court meant to
say that the whole law has never
recognized the unborn as legal
persons. That I think is true, e.g.
"perfection" of standing and of
the right to sue for pre-natal injury only comes with birth. But
"entitlement" to property conveyed to someone in utero is as to
right perfect at that time; further
"perfection" here can only mean
collecting the cash to which right
was fully established at the time
of con veya 1.
The Fitkin Case
Then there is t he N. J . case
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital u. Anderson, 201
A2d 537, 42 N . J . 421 (1964),
perhaps the crest of legal acknowledgment of the unborn as full
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legal persons in one part of our
law. Here in t he case of a Jehovah '
Witness mother who refused a
blood t ransfusion and who was
pregnant, the court confronted
the alternative of whether to
bring this case under (1) the line
of cases of adult Witnesses which
generally respects their First
Amendment right of religious liberty and does not compel transfusion even to save physical life,
or under (2) the line of cases
dealing with infants or minors of
Jehovah Witnesses whose parents
refuse to authorize blood transfusions: here generally the courts
have taken jurisdiction of the
children and authorized the recommended or necessary medical
treatment even against the religious conscience of the parents.
Which sort of case was Fithin ?
Both child and mother would die
unless the state intervened. Chief
Justice Weintraub wrote for a
unanimous court": "We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and
that an appropriate order should
be made to insure blood transfusions to the mother. . . . We
have no difficulty in so deciding
with respect to the infant child.
. .. It is unnecssary to decide the
question (of compelling t he adult
against her conscience ) because
the welfare of the child and the
mother are so intertwined and insepa ra ble that it would be impracti cal to distinguish between
them . . . " Notably in t his case
the humanity and rights of the
unborn child prevailed over the
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First Amendment rights of the
mother, which is a near-absolute
in American law, when these were
inseparably intertwined. There
can scarcely be stronger evidence
than that of recognition in our
law of the unborn as a person in
the whole sense, granting that this
does not hold for the whole of our
law.
In this instance the issues in
the case were decided after Mrs.
Anderson had left the hospital.
Following Wade, we can imagine
another escape: she could request
an elective abortion, thereby prevent our law from successfully
treating her child as a legally protectable person, and from her
point of view deliver both him
and herself intact of soul ("the
blood is the life") until the day
of the general resurrection! Such
is by comparison the measure of
the far more trivial reasons conscious persons may now use to
disregard the rightful claims of
the unborn, if indeed these exist
any longer at all following Wade.
The privatization of abortion decisions means that no one need
reach for a First Amendment
right to consider overriding the
right of the unborn to his or her
life. No parity or balancing judgment need now be made, not even
one favoring the mother's conscience. Instead, states are now
expressly forbidden to bring the
rights of the unborn as such into
consideration. The minimum of
regulations that are allowed indirectly expressive of some interest in "the potentiality of life"
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must everyone be reasonably related directly only to the life and
health of the mother. She is the
one life to be treated as a person
in the whole sense; or, I should
say, even partially so in the face
of the law.
The fetus is not fully protectable (not fully a legal person),
even after viability! Even after
viability, the unborn child's right
to life is not treated as needing
to be in parity with the mother's
life before being killed. Her health
also may outweigh the child's
life. The Court said hypothetically: "If the State is interested in
protecting fetal life after viability,
it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother." I suppose most procedures directed toward trying to
save a viable baby may have
some adverse affect on the
"health" of the mother, especially as that term is now too broadly
interpreted by the medical profession. In an article generally
favorable to permissive abortion
and the Court's decision, Sissela
Bok, lecturer in Medical Ethics
at Radcliffe College (the President of Harvard is her consort)
pleads: "Every effort must be
made by physicians and others
to construe the Supreme Court's
statement (the foregoing statement) to concern, in effect, only
the life or threat to life of the
mother."4 In a civilized society,
why would Sissela Bok have so
to plead? Why should the deciLinacre Quarterly

sion to what extent a viable baby
should be valued be privatized?
Why should physicians be endowed with such arbitrary power
over young life that they need to
be enjoined not to use it? In this,
as well as in its reference to the
unborn's capacity for "meaningful" life outside the uterus, the
Court steps across the line into
"neo-naticide" of viable babies.
The Ambiguity Remains
Still the rightful claims of the
unborn are manifest in the ambiguity that remains. There are
taxpayers' or other sorts of suits
going forward in the courts asking that, following Wade, jurisdictions that interpreted the Aid to
Dependent Children Act to include pregnant welfare women be
prohibited from doing so - on
the ground, I suppose, that these
women are not yet "with child"
in t he law's meaning. Other lower court decisions have held to the
contrary that these women cannot constitutionally be refused
listing as welfare mothers. These
latter cases raise the question:
how can the state make payments
in support of a person who does
not exist? to her on account of
no human being within? They
raise the even more crucial moral
question: if ADC payments are
made to a woman for one or two
months after her pregnancy is affirmed, and she then decides to
elect an abortion under other laws
that now treat her as the only
person involved in that. issue, has
she not to say the least frustrated
the purpose of the ADC payNovember, 1974

ments to her? Surely there now
is an intolerable contradiction between the legal personhood and
the legal non-personhood ascribed
to the unborn.
Such are the perplexities that
flow from violating ordinary language in speaking of the unborn,
especially in an era in which this
usage has the backing of our modern knowledge of the independent, individual humanity of unborn life. We do not ordinarily
say a woman is "with embryo" or
that she is "carrying a fetus."
The attempt to say "fetus" rather
than "child " is always an effort
at first. We can become habituated to it, of course, just as we now
customarily say "interrupt a pregnancy" when we mean abortion,
although that expression was once
t he way doctors spoke of Caesarian sections to save an unborn
life that could not he hrought to
natural hirth!
So too my own church has
schooled itself to speak in its
statement of Social Principles
(adopted by General Conference
in Atlanta, 1972) of "the sanctity
of unborn human life," of "the
sacredness of the life and wellbeing of the mother (sic)" and in
the same breath to call for the
"removal of abortion from the
criminal code, placing it instead
under laws relating to other procedures of standard medical practice. " If there is unborn human
life and if there indeed is a
"mother," then abortion is not
like any other "standard medical
practice." Not until euthanasia
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or "neo-naticide" becomes "standard." And life-and-death decisions involving lives possessing
sanctity have never before in the
history of our civil community
been believed to be a proper subject for purely privatized choices.'

views on abortion, and those who
agree with them, kept within the
public forum; and not enshrine
them in the Constitution or in
Court-made law - a restraint the
pro-permissive abortion advocates
were not willing to exercise.

An Amendment As
Possible Remedy

It may be that we have passed
the point of no return to that
remedy; and that this Committee
and the U. S. Senate will judge
it wiser to frame an amendment
in some fashion substantively protecting the unborn from arbitrary
choices. Here there may be an
analogy with what followed in the
wake of the Dred Scott decision.
That decision took from the free
states and territories the right
and the power to recognize the
humanity and protect rights of
black people and ex-slaves. We all
know the sequel: a tragic civil
war, a more perfect union wrought
out through carnage and sacrifice, the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed on the former slave
states. Perhaps that direct approach and substantive constitutional protection of the rights and
liberties of black ex-slaves was the
better way - instead of trusting
the far slower process of political
and legislative deliberation in the
free states and the gradual erosion of slavery where it existed.
Perhaps, then, some form of substantive constitutional protection
of unborn human life is needed to
overturn the "substantive due
process" of a judicial decision that
has the effect of turning every
question both as to the wisdom
and as to the morality of abortion

I urge this Commitee and the
U. S. Senate as a body to move an
amendment to the Constitution
that would return to the states
their legislative power to protect
the unborn child from privatized
physician-patient decisions about
its life or death. Such an amendment would in no way bind in advance the decisions subsequently
to be taken by the states. Liberalization of abortion, perhaps
its entire decriminalization would
still be options open to the states.
This would be a minimum remedy, and the Senate may view it as
optimal. The thrust of my testimony, however, is to leave the
content of an amendment up to
the wisdom of the Senate; and for
my own part simply to say that
almost any remedy at this point
in time would be better than no
remedy at all. For the thrust of
my testimony has been to the
point of reversing the privatization by the Court of decisions
concerning protedable humanity,
and toward the right of the people to decide matters of such crucial importance to our social compact through ongoing public debate and the political and legislative processes of this nation.
I am willing to have my own
276
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over to private decision-makers.
There will be others testifying
before you who will object to my
One must at the least insist on
placing confidence in the people
the strong analogy between these
through
their representatives to
two constitutional crises. This najudge
who
counts as a human life.
tion is in a state of civil and moral .
This
confidence
may seem like
strife. Not because " pro-life" peothe
Court's
touching
faith in
ple are generally speaking unwillphysicians
to
make
independent
ing to be outvoted; but because
medical decisions and not to perthey now have no voice to cast
form abortions on request, or its
about the extent of the human
privatizing
of these decisions and
community in which we are to
regulating
the
wisdom and justice
live. The right to life is 80 basic
of
such
decisions
only by licensure
to our civil compact that one can
as
if
they
are
matters
of standard
imagine the divisions among us
medical
practice
and
not
also poleading to open conflict, but for
litical
or
societal
decisions
about
two differences: (1) Because of
the
boundary
of
the
human
comthe more perfect union wrought
munity
of
an
equal
justice
to
all.
by the Civil War there now exist
My
point
is
simply
that
physino states claiming or actually excians are society's deputies in apercising the sovereignty they once
plying the criteria for stating that
did: another loss of rights and
a
new human being has put in his
powers formerly reserved to the
appearance
or has passed from
states cannot now be resisted,
among
us.
My
point thereafter is
and of course ought not to be. (2)
that
decisions
as to the
simply
In our present case no one has a
criteria
are
necessarily
human
"property" self-interest to assert
decisions,
too;
that
such
decisions
or to deny in the case of the unas to the extent of our social comborn child as in the case of the
pact must rest with the people
slaves. (The claim that a woman
and
our deliberative processes;
has a right to do what she will
that
"the buck stops here" and
"with her own body" comes close
cannot
be appealed to anyone's
to a property-claim over the fetus;
private
"revelation"
nor ought it
but perhaps that language ought
to
be
taken
from
us
and then
not to be taken seriously.) For
handed
over
to
a
pair
of other
these reasons, our present conhuman
beings
to
decide
or
to any
stitutional crisis is apt to expend
group
less
than
the
total
body
itself in moral passion; and, unpolitic.
less there is remedy, further steps
privatizing life-and-death deciReturning the Issue to the States
sions and massive alienation from
Perhaps my confidence that rethe body politic that has given
over to private choices the deterturning the abortion issue to the
mination of who belongs with us
states may be a sufficient remedy
as a people each counting for one
rests back upon my belief that the
and no one for more than one.
factual evidence (that is all it can
November, 1974
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be: a set of factual "good reasons") for the individuated humanity of the unborn child is now
quite as clear as the evidence for
the human countenance of any
black, or of any Senator or of anyone who testifies before you. Before we were so rudely interrupted on January 22, 1973, the
weight of the evidence had opened
a new era of human childhood, as
I have said, and this weight was
making its imprint on our law itself. The Court might have taken
judicial notice of that evidence,
instead of facing away from it. It
is certainly the business of state
legislatures and now of the Con gress to take notice of facts concerning the unborn. There is reason enough in our modem knowledge for a Constitutional amendment substantively protecting the
unborn in some fashion and from
some stage in their achievement
of individuated humanity.
That would be a maximal remedy; my tentative proposal is a
minimal one; Congress should say
which is optimal and/ or feasible.
Taken alone, Senator Mondale's
"family impact" test would, I suspect, have led us long ago in the
direction of federal marriage and
divorce legislation, as now maybe
that test should lead us to see the
need for some substantive decision-making at the constitutional
level or at the federal legislative
level on the matter of abortion.
But our system is built upon the
50 state jurisdictions; and, because of this, and in spite of some
clear disadvantages that has, I
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incline toward a constitutional solution limited to returning to the
states and the people within each
of those jurisdictions the question
of what we mean by the social
compact of life with life.
Professor Paul Freund, the distinguished authority on constitutionallaw at Harvard University,
has said that our system of division of powers - executive, legislative, and judicial - ultimately
must rest upon the exercise of
what he calls "constitutional morality." The staff of the House
Judiciary Committee must have
had "constitutional morality" in
mind when in its memorandum on
the meaning of an impeachable
offense it said that a President
has the duty "not to abuse his
powers or transgress their limits
- ... not to act in derogration of
powers vested elsewhere by the
Constitution;" and again in its
reference to "adverse impact on
the system of government."6 If
that is correct, then impeachment
of a President is a remedy for any
derogration of powers vested elsewhere by the Constitution; it is a
way to insure "constitutional
morality."
The fact is, however, that impeachment is no remedy for an
exercise of judicial power in derogation of powers vested elsewhere
or for decisions of the Court that
have an adverse effect on our system of government. It is no remedy for decisions "beyond the call
of Constitutional duty." That
remedy is Constitutional amendment; that is the way to insure
Linacre Quarterly

that "constitutional morality"
shall continue constantly to be a
restraint upon judicial activism.
To our founding fathers in Constitutional Convention, Professor
Edward Corwin has pointed out
in his book The President, Office
and Powers, "the executive magistracy was the natural enemy,
the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty." The members of the Constitutional Convention, of course, knew nothing
of the judicial review that was
later to become established. They
could not have imagined that the
judicial magistracy might become
the natural enemy of liberty or of
the legislative power in its direction of an ordered liberty. It
would be ironical if the natural
friend of liberty, our national legislature, should now be aroused to
institute impeachment procedures
against an "imperial Presidency"
for acts in derogation of powers
vested elsewhere by the Constitution or for acts having adverse impact on our system of government, and if then the Congress
does not bestir itself to use the
remedy of Constitutional amendment to correct a decision of an
imperial Court that likewise has
effects in derogration of powers
vested elsewhere by the Constitution and adverse impact on the
division between the judicial and
the legislative power.
It would be undefendable if impeachment may be used to chasten the executive magistracy and
not an amendment to chasten the
judicial magistracy; if against the
one hut not the other "ConstituNovemher, 1974

tional morality" can be sustained.
In this regard, the extent to which
a Supreme Court decision is popularly and automatically believed
to be the last word on what the
law is is also a measure of how
legislative and amendatory authority has slipped from "the
legislative assembly." The Court,
of course, in Bolton (issued, I
suppose, one minute after Wade)
ceremonially refers to Wade in
the matter of what the law is.
There can be no objection to that
manner of speaking when the
Court does it. But if the people,
the state legislatures and the
Congress join the chant, that is a
certain sign that we wish to crown
the judicial magistracy and legitimate its word as our final law.
The amendatory procedure is
more legitimate still ; and it is our
chief recourse for insuring that
what Freund called "Constitutional morality" shall be a force
in the interplay of the separate
powers in our government. In any
case, anyone who believes that
there was need to submit to the
states an "equal rights" amendment, going beyond the Fourteenth in guaranteeing equal
rights for women , cannot with
any consistency object to an
amendment going beyond the
Fourteenth, and correcting the
Court's interpretation of it in
Wade and Bolton, now being submitted to the states for possible
adoption into our fundamental
law. Object they surely will, with
inconsistency and distrust of the
people and of their right to amend
in this instance. Unhesitatingly,
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the call should go forth for the
Congress to move an amendment
that at the least restores to the
states legislative power to decide
whether and how human life-anddeath questions shall be dealt
with in the criminal law and in
regulation of the fateful actions
of physicians.
The opponents of a Life
Amendment may finally be correeL The issue is the right of
choice or decision. But that must
be rightly understood. The issue
is the right of a people through
the legislative process to set the
"credentials," the criteria, the
signs of humanity to be used in
making life-and-death decisions.
Setting the outer limits of the
human community should not be
allowed to pass into the hands of
private individuals, one, two, or
many.
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